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Neutrality of Narrative Discussion in Annual Reports 
 of UK Listed Companies 
 
Summary 
 
This paper reports the results of an investigation into the neutrality of the narrative 
discussion of financial performance and position, as evidenced in 179 annual reports 
of UK listed companies. Neutrality of narrative discussion was determined by 
comparing the average proportions of good and bad news contained in the narrative 
and statutory accounts sections of the annual reports. The results of a comparison of 
the proportion of good news in the two sections of the annual reports suggest that the 
narrative sections contained a significantly higher proportion of good news than the 
statutory accounts sections. Comparison of proportions of bad news, however, 
indicates that the narrative sections contained a significantly lower proportion of bad 
news compared to the statutory accounts sections. Finally, the results also suggest that 
the proportion of good news as compared to bad news in the narrative sections is 
significantly higher than the proportion of good news compared to bad news in the 
statutory accounts section. The results are consistent with the suggestion that 
company management highlights good news in narrative discussions. The 
implications of the findings for company management, users, auditors and regulators 
are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Annual reports in the UK consist of the narrative and statutory accounts sections. The 
only legal requirement for the narrative section is the inclusion of the directors' report. 
Most listed companies, however, also include the chairman's statement and the 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) on a voluntary basis. For the statutory accounts 
section, the Companies Act 1985 requires the inclusion of the profit and loss account, 
balance sheet and notes to the accounts. In addition, Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 
1 also requires companies to include a cash flow statement as part of the financial 
statements. 
 
The principal objectives of the narrative section are to supplement the financial 
information in the financial statements with discussions and explanations about the 
company’s activities and its future, and to provide details of other non-financial matters 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999). In other words, the purpose of the narrative section is 
to complement financial statements so as to provide the user of financial statements with 
a complete picture of the company’s financial performance and position. For example, 
the Companies Act 1985 requires the discussion of research and development activities 
and significant changes in the fixed assets of the company during the year.  Such 
information not only refers readers to changes in monetary figures in the statutory 
accounts section but may also provide further information such as the reasons for the 
expenditure on research and development and its likely effect on future results.  
 
There is, however, a general consensus that the narrative discussion of the company’s 
financial position and performance needs to be neutral in terms of highlighting both 
good and bad news that has affected or may affect the performance of the company.  
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 If the discussion is not neutral it may not be useful to the users. Neutrality in narrative 
discussion is especially important to potential investors with little or no knowledge of 
accounting, who rely on the narrative section of the annual report (see for example, Lee 
and Tweedie, 1975; Wilton and Tabb, 1978; Winfield, 1978; and Bartlett and Chandler, 
1997). Even sophisticated investors, such as investment analysts, will not be able to 
value a company accurately if the narrative discussion is biased.  
 
The importance attached to ensuring neutrality of narrative information is reflected in the 
various mandatory and non-mandatory pronouncements. For example, the Companies 
Act 1985 requires a ‘fair review of development of the business and its subsidiary 
undertakings during the financial year and their position at the end of it’ [s234 (1) (a)]. 
The Accounting Standards Board’s (ASB) (1999) Statement of Principles requires 
financial information to be reliable. One element of reliability is neutrality. Financial 
information is not neutral if it has been selected or presented in such a way as to 
influence the making of a decision or judgement in order to achieve a predetermined 
result or outcome. Finally, the Operating and Financial Review (1993), although 
voluntary, suggests that one of the essential features of management discussion of 
operations and financial position is that ‘it should be balanced and objective, dealing 
even-handedly with both good and bad aspects’.  
 
Despite the need to ensure neutrality of narrative discussion of the financial position and 
performance of the company, problems with the current legislative framework on 
narrative discussion may lead to selectivity in what is discussed in the narrative section. 
First, the wording relating to what directors must discuss in the directors’ report is too 
lax. For example, the Companies Act 1985 [s234 (2)] states that ‘the principal activities 
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of both the company and its subsidiaries during the year, and any details of any 
significant changes in those activities, should be stated’. What is ‘principal’ or 
‘significant’ is, however, not defined by the Act. Secondly, despite requiring information 
contained in the directors’ report to be sufficient in quantity and quality to satisfy the 
reasonable expectations of the readers, there is no audit requirement to ensure that this is 
the case. The only requirement is for auditors to carry out investigations to determine 
whether or not the information contained in the directors' report is consistent with the 
financial statements. Finally, directors are at liberty to include any other narrative 
information outside the mandatory directors’ report, such as the chairman’s statement, 
finance director’s report and the Operation and Finance Review.  
 
The absence of strict requirements on what directors should discuss in relation to the 
financial position and performance of the company gives rise to the concern that 
company directors may seize the opportunity to present themselves in a more favourable 
light. For example, Straw et al (1983) examined the letters to shareholders of companies 
that had experienced an increase and a decrease in financial performance in terms of 
earnings per share. They found that the companies were more likely to highlight positive 
rather than negative financial performance. Further, Beattie and Jones (1992) also found 
that companies were significantly more likely to include graphs to highlight good rather 
than bad performance.  
 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether company management of UK listed 
companies is neutral in the narrative discussion of the financial performance and position 
contained in the statutory accounts (profit and loss account and balance sheet) in respect 
of both good and bad news. The study is important to a number of annual report 
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stakeholders. For example, for company management, findings that indicate a bias in 
narrative discussion may result in more regulation of the narrative part of the annual 
report. More regulation will mean objective information being available to the users of 
annual reports. Finally, the findings of biased narrative discussion may also mean that in 
future auditors may well have to assume a greater role in ensuring neutrality of narrative 
discussion.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The following section is a discussion 
of the UK narrative discussion framework. Section 3 is a review of literature, which 
forms the basis of the hypotheses. The research methodology, which  gives details of the 
sample and the results of a questionnaire, follows this. The results of the study are 
presented and discussed in Section 5. The final section is a conclusion, highlighting 
implications and limitations. 
 
2. The UK narrative discussion framework  
The narrative section of annual reports in the UK may consist of a chairman's statement, 
Operating and Financial Review, the finance director’s review, and the directors' report. 
The Companies Act 1985 only requires the inclusion of the directors’ report. For 
example, the Companies Act 1985 requires that ‘the amount (if any) that the directors 
recommend should be paid as dividend must be stated’ [s234 (1) (b)]. Further, the 
Companies Act 1985 also states that ‘particulars of any important events affecting the 
company or any of its subsidiaries that have occurred since the end of the financial year 
must be disclosed [7 Sch 6 (a)]. Finally, Companies Act 1985 also requires disclosure to 
be made in respect of directors’ interest in shares or debentures of the company or any 
body corporate of the same group [s 325]. 
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In addition, the London Stock Exchange (1999) listing rules (LR) also stipulate further 
requirements that listed companies must include in the directors’ report. The listing rules  
require that the directors’ report for listed companies must state the unexpired term of 
the  service contracts of any director who is proposed for re-election at the forthcoming 
Annual General Meeting. If the directors proposed for re-election do not have service 
contracts, the directors’ report must state the fact [LR16.8, 16.12]. Further, the listing 
rules also state that ‘a statement should be given of particulars of the nature and extent of 
the interests of any person, in any holdings of three per cent or more of the nominal 
value of any class of capital carrying rights to vote in all circumstances at general 
meetings of the company. The statement must be made at a date not more than one 
month prior to the date of notice of the annual general meeting’ [LR12.43]. Finally, the 
listing rules also require disclosure of transactions with controlling shareholders, waiver 
of dividends and compliance with the Combined Code.   
 
In addition to the mandatory information to be included in the directors’ report, the ASB 
(1993) issued the Operating and Financial Review, which is voluntary. The aim was to 
extend existing best practice by providing a framework within which directors could 
share the company's financial performance with stakeholders. Some of the essential 
features of the OFR are that it should: 
• be written in a clear style and as succinctly as possible;  
• be readily understandable by the general reader of annual reports and include only 
matters that are likely to be significant to investors;  
• be balanced and objective, dealing even-handedly with both good and bad aspects;  
• contain analytical discussion rather than merely numerical analysis; and  
• make it clear how ratios or other numerical information given relate to the 
financial statements.  
 
The OFR also recommends a discussion of significant features of the operating 
performance for the period covered by the financial statements. This can cover all 
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aspects of the profit and loss account such as the level of profit on ordinary activities 
before taxation, the levels of capital expenditure, profit for the financial year, total 
recognised gains and losses, dividends and earnings per share, capital structure and 
treasury policy, taxation, funds from operating and other sources of cash, liquidity and 
the balance sheet value.   
 
3. Review of literature 
There is considerable debate and many assumptions as to how managers behave in 
financial reporting. Most academics have seized on the agency theory based on the 
seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  The theory is concerned with the 
principal-agent problem in the separation of ownership and control of the firm, between 
different suppliers of capital (Smith and Warner, 1979), and in the separation of risk 
bearing firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983). At the heart of agency theory is the assumption 
that managers act so as to maximise utility. Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrated the 
utility maximisation assumption by comparing the behaviour of a manager when he owns 
all the shares in the company and his behaviour when he owns some shares in the 
company. They argue that if a wholly-owned company is managed by the owner, 
operating decisions are attributable to the owner, and the operating profits accruing are 
likely to be more than those that are attributable to the owner if the firm is managed by 
the agent.  
 
Agency theory is, however, not without its critics. For example, Metzger et al. (1986) 
note that business agency was originally a legal concept defined as a two-party 
relationship in which one party (the agent) is authorised to act on behalf of, and under the 
control of, the other party (the principal). Metzger et al. (1986) add that the laws of 
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agency imposed specific duties of loyalty on the agent which Clark (1985) identified as a 
‘fiduciary duty of loyalty’ and which in total help to deter abuse of managerial (agency) 
discretion. Duska (1992) states that since the first application of the agency-principal 
relationship to commercial ventures required loyalty, the concept of agency logically 
implied loyalty. He further argues that economists dropped the notion of loyalty because 
the view of human nature that they adopted was the view of the self-interested rational 
maximizer, a view incompatible with any desire to be bounded by loyalty to a principal.  
Duska (1992) however, suggests that managers act out of self-interest to an extent but not 
in all cases. He states that ‘clearly there is an extent to which Smith (1776) and his 
followers are right. Human beings are essentially selfish and will not always look out for 
the interest of others but there are times when they will set aside their own interest and 
act on behalf of others’, (p. 148 ). 
 
Despite the inconclusive nature of the debate on whether managers act out of self-
interest, a number of studies in financial reporting using agency theory have largely 
confirmed the axioms of agency theory. For example, studies of accounting choices such 
as Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) found evidence that managers chose accounting 
policies that increased their bonuses. Disclosure studies (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987 
and Botosan and Harris, 2000) also suggest that managers behave in a self-interested 
manner. Further, findings by Beattie and Jones (1992) that managers are likely to use 
graphs in the annual report if their companies have performed well is further evidence 
that managers sometimes look after their own interests. Finally, Straw et al. (1983) found 
that high performing companies place an overwhelming emphasis on positive events. 
Surprisingly, they also found that even low performing companies emphasised positive 
events. Clearly, such evidence suggests that managers do not always report financial 
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information in an unbiased way. Based on this discussion the following three hypotheses 
were derived:   
 
H 1 The narrative sections of the annual reports of UK listed companies contain a 
significantly higher proportion of good news compared to the proportion of good 
news contained in the statutory accounts sections. 
 
H 2 The narrative sections of annual reports of UK listed companies contain a 
significantly lower proportion of bad news compared to the proportion of bad 
news contained in the statutory accounts sections. 
 
H 3 The proportion of good to bad news contained in the narrative sections of annual 
reports of UK listed companies is significantly higher than the proportion of good 
to bad news contained in the statutory accounts sections. 
 
4. Research methodology 
4.1 Sample 
A sample of 240 companies, representing 20% of all UK non-financial companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange as at 31 December 2001, was randomly 
selected. A letter was sent to all these companies requesting their annual reports. 
Thirty-nine companies did not respond to the initial and two follow up requests and 
nine companies were eliminated because they had changed their accounting periods. 
Since the investigation required two years’ data, thirteen companies were removed 
because they had been listed for less than two years. This left 179 companies. This 
paper reports on the results of an analysis of the annual reports of these 179 
companies.  
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4.2 Methodology 
Two research methods were employed in this research. The first one was a 
questionnaire survey of finance directors to determine what constitutes good and bad 
news. The second research method was content analysis of the annual report. This 
research method involved comparing the results of the items listed in appendix I for 
the year 2001 and 2000 to determine whether there had been an increase or decrease. 
The objective was to find out, using the results of a survey of finance directors, 
whether the changes to those items between the years 2000 and 2001 constituted good 
or bad news. The narrative section of each annual report was then read to determine 
how much of the good and bad news contained in the profit and loss and balance sheet 
was discussed. The detailed procedures are discussed in the relevant sections below. 
 
4.2.1 Survey of finance directors 
The survey was based on a questionnaire listing all the items that are required to be 
disclosed in the profit and loss and balance sheet in terms of the Companies Act 1985, 
Accounting Standards and the London Stock Exchange listing rules. The questionnaire 
was pilot tested with five practising accountants. This resulted in the elimination of a 
number of items.  The final version of the questionnaire consisted of a total of 36 items. 
The first 18 items relate to the items found in the profit and loss account and the last 18 
items to those found in the balance sheet. The questionnaire was sent to 30 randomly 
selected finance directors of the FTSE 100 companies to determine their views, on a 
scale of 1 to 5 (1 suggesting bad news and 5 good news), on whether an increase in the 
amounts for the 36 items from the year 2000 to 2001 constituted bad or good news. Any 
item with a ranking of below 3 was classified as bad news and that with a ranking above 
 11
this figure as good news. After two reminders five usable responses had been received 
making a response rate of just under 17%.  
 
The descriptive statistics of all the items are presented in Table 1. The results of the 
ranking of the profit and loss items suggest that finance directors surveyed view an 
increase in retained earnings and turnover as good news, as reflected in the high mean 
scores of 4.8 and 4.6 respectively. An increase in gross profit, profit for the year, and 
dividends is also viewed by finance directors as good news.  The increase in loss on 
disposal of discontinued operations, net operating expenses and provision for loss on 
discontinued operations is regarded as representing bad news by the finance directors 
who responded to the survey.  
 
The results of the ranking of balance sheet items by finance directors suggest that an 
increase in fixed assets, share premium and the retained profit and loss account represent 
good news. The mean ranking of all these items is 4.2. The finance directors also ranked 
an increase in tangible and intangible assets, debtors and cash as good news. The increase 
in provision for taxation, bank overdraft, creditors due after one year and debentures is 
seen as bad news as indicated by the mean scores of 1.8 for each of these items.  
 
The findings reported in this section are generally consistent with the expectations from 
finance literature that regards increase in cost as bad news and revenue as good news. 
However, it was important to obtain some empirical evidence to confirm the 
assumptions. A large-scale survey of finance directors was deemed unnecessary in the 
light of confirmatory evidence from the small sample. A much larger survey on the same 
subject largely confirmed the findings reported above but is a subject of a different paper.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of good and bad news (N=5) 
 
  
       
Min 
     
Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Turnover 4.00 5.00 4.60 .5477 
Cost of sales 1.00 2.00 1.40 .5477 
Gross profit 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Net operating expenses 1.00 2.00 1.60 .5477 
Operating profit 4.00 5.00 4.40 .5477 
Profit on property sale 3.00 4.00 3.60 .5477 
Provision for loss on operations to be 
discontinued  1.00 3.00 1.80 .8367 
Loss on disposal of discontinued 
operations 1.00 2.00 1.40 .5477 
Profit before interest 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Interest payable 1.00 3.00 2.00 .7071 
Profit before tax 4.00 5.00 4.20 .4472 
Taxation 1.00 3.00 2.00 .7071 
Profit after tax 4.00 5.00 4.40 .5477 
Minority interests 2.00 3.00 2.20 .4472 
Profit for the year 4.00 5.00 4.40 .5477 
Dividends 4.00 5.00 4.40 .5477 
Retained profit 4.00 5.00 4.80 .4472 
Earnings per share 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Fixed assets (total) 3.00 5.00 4.20 .8367 
Tangible assets 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Intangible assets 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Current assets (total) 3.00 4.00 3.60 .5477 
Stocks 3.00 4.00 3.60 .5477 
Debtors 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Cash 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Prepayments 2.00 3.00 2.60 .5477 
Creditors due in one year 2.00 3.00 2.20 .4472 
Provision for tax 1.00 2.00 1.80 .4472 
Accrued charges 2.00 3.00 2.20 .4472 
Bank overdraft 1.00 2.00 1.80 .4472 
Net current assets 3.00 5.00 4.00 .7071 
Creditors due after one year 1.00 2.00 1.80 .4472 
Debentures 1.00 2.00 1.80 .4472 
Share capital 1.00 3.00 2.00 .7071 
Share premium 4.00 5.00 4.20 .4472 
Profit and loss 4.00 5.00 4.20 .4472 
 
Key: 
1. bad news                3. neither bad news               4. slightly good news  
2. slightly bad news                        or good news                    5. good news 
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4.2.2 Determining the proportion of ‘good’ and 'bad' news 
To determine the proportions of good and bad news in the statutory accounts section of 
each annual report the scoring sheet (see appendix II) was used. Based on the results of 
the survey of directors each of the 36 items was scored as either good news or bad news. 
This was determined by examining whether the 2001 figures represented an increase or 
decrease compared to those of the previous year (2000). If for example, turnover had 
gone up a ‘G’ was placed alongside that item in the scoring sheet to indicate that for that 
company there was good news in respect of turnover. If on the other hand turnover had 
gone down, a ‘B’ was placed alongside turnover to indicate that was bad news. The 
procedure was carried out for each of the 36 items in a similar way. In the end the 
number of ‘Gs’ and ‘Bs’ was counted. If it turned out that the number of ‘Gs’ was 18 
and the number of ‘Bs’ was 18, the proportion of good and bad news was recorded as 
50% good news and 50% bad news respectively. This was based on dividing 18 by the 
total of 36 items in each case. If any of the 36 items in appendix II was not applicable 
to one company then the denominator was reduced by the total of inapplicable items. 
 
To establish the proportions of good and bad news being discussed in the narrative 
section of the annual reports a scoring sheet (see appendix III) was used. The 
procedure entailed going through the narrative section of each company’s annual 
report (chairman's statement, operating and financial review and directors' report) and 
identifying all statements discussing any of the 36 items. If the item discussed was 
coded as representing good news in the statutory accounts section it was similarly 
coded 'G' to signify that the statement was discussing good news contained in the 
statutory accounts.  
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Similarly, when a statement was found that was discussing an item that was coded as 
representing bad news in the statutory accounts it was coded ‘B’ representing bad 
news. As with the statutory accounts section, the final procedure to determine the 
proportion of good news and bad news was adding all ‘Gs’ and ‘Bs’ and expressing 
the total of each as a percentage of the sum of all ‘Gs’ and ‘Bs’.  However, since it is 
unrealistic to expect each company to discuss all 36 items, the proportion of good or 
bad news was determined by dividing the total number of ‘Gs’ by the total of both 
‘Gs’ and ‘Bs’. This means that, for example, if the company discussed just 10 out of 
the 36 items, and 5 items related to good and the other 5 to bad news, the proportion of 
good news would be 50% and bad news 50%.  
 
4.3 Determination of neutrality of narrative discussion 
To test hypothesis 1, which states that narrative sections contain a significantly higher 
proportion of good news than the statutory accounts sections, required comparing the 
average (mean) proportions of good news contained in the narrative sections and 
statutory accounts sections of the annual reports of the 179 companies. The logic is 
that, given the 36 items under investigation, if a company had 50% of the items 
representing ‘good’ news in the statutory accounts section, then the discussion in the 
narrative section of the annual report should contain an average of 50% relating to 
good news items. If in the narrative section the percentage of discussion of good news 
was significantly higher than 50%, that would suggest a bias in the narrative 
discussion in favour of good news. 
 
To test hypothesis 2, which states that narrative sections contain a significantly lower 
proportion of bad news than the statutory accounts sections, required comparing the 
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average proportion of bad news in the narrative section and in the statutory accounts 
section. If the average proportion of bad news contained in the statutory accounts was 
significantly higher than that contained in the narrative section that would suggest that 
management was discussing very little of their ‘bad’ news.  
 
Finally, hypothesis 3, which states that the proportion of good to bad news contained 
in the narrative section is significantly higher that the proportion of good to bad news 
contained in the statutory accounts section, was tested. This was tested by comparing 
proportions of good to bad news contained in the narrative sections to the proportion 
of good to bad news contained in the statutory accounts sections.  
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the proportions of good news contained in 
the narrative and statutory accounts sections of the annual reports. The results show 
that the mean (average) for the narrative section is 0.7203 compared to 0.6302 for the 
statutory accounts section. This suggests that the proportion of narrative discussion 
reflecting good news is higher than the proportion of good news found in the statutory 
accounts. This in turn suggests a bias in the narrative discussion in favour of good 
news. The minimum scores for the narrative and the statutory accounts sections are 
.00 and .17 respectively. The maximum score of 1.00 for the narrative section 
indicates that at least one company chose to discuss all good news and none of the bad 
news. The results in Table 2 also show a greater variation in the distribution of the 
proportion of good news in the narrative section compared to the statutory accounts 
section as reflected by the differences in standard deviations of .2714 and .1982 
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respectively. This may be explained by the fact that companies are largely free to 
decide which items they discuss in the narrative section whilst items to be included in 
financial statements are prescribed by law. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of good news 
 
Proportions in narrative and statutory accounts sections of the annual reports  
 
   N      Mean  Min  Max  Std Dev 
Narrative 179      .7203 .00            1.00  .2714 
Statutory         179      .6302 .17   .92  .1982 
 
 
 
The descriptive statistics for the proportion of bad news in the narrative sections and 
statutory accounts sections are presented in Table 3. The mean score for the narrative 
section is 0.2685 compared to 0.3698 for the statutory accounts section. This suggests 
that the companies are discussing less bad news than that contained in the statutory 
accounts. This in turn suggests a bias in the narrative disclosures against bad news. 
The minimum proportion of bad news for the narrative and statutory accounts sections 
are .00 and .08 respectively. This suggests that at least one company did not discuss 
any bad news. The results in Table 3 also show a greater variation in the narrative 
section compared to statutory accounts section as indicated by the variations in the 
two standard deviations. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of bad news 
 
Proportions in narrative and statutory accounts sections of the annual report  
 
   N          Mean   Min  Max  Std Dev 
Narrative        179         .2685  .00            1.00  .2619 
Statutory        179         .3698  .08    .83  .1982 
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5.2 T-test results 
The one-sample t-test results for neutrality of narrative discussion in respect of good 
news are presented in Table 4. The test shows whether the differences in the mean of 
the proportion of good news in the narrative sections and the proportion of good news 
in the statutory accounts sections, are statistically different from zero. The two-tailed 
test is used so that either a positive difference or negative difference can be detected. 
The t-statistic is 4.737 and is significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that there is a 
positive significant difference between the average proportion of good news contained 
in the narrative section and the average proportion of good news contained in the 
statutory accounts section. The implication is that the proportion of good news in the 
narrative section is greater than the proportion of good news contained in the statutory 
accounts. 
 
Table 4 One-sample statistics for neutrality of narrative discussion in respect of  
good news (test value = 0) 
                  95% confidence 
Variable      t-statistic    df Sig. (2-tailed)   Mean   Std Dev         interval of the 
         difference 
         Lower      Upper 
Good news   4.737       178       .00             .1794    .5067              .1047      .2542 
 
 
Table 5 presents the one sample t-test results of neutrality in respect of bad news. A 
two-tailed significant test was also employed to detect any difference in the average 
proportions of bad news contained in the narrative and statutory accounts sections of 
the annual reports. The t-statistic is -6.245 and the mean score difference is -.2957. In 
other words the difference between the average proportion of bad news in the 
narrative section and that in the statutory accounts section is negative. This suggests 
that companies discuss a lesser proportion of bad news in the narrative section 
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compared to what is contained in the statutory accounts. The difference is significant 
at 0.01 level.  
 
Table 5 One-sample statistics for neutrality of narrative discussion of bad news 
(test value = 0) 
 
                  
 
         95% confidence 
Variable       t-statistic    df Sig. (2-tailed)   Mean        Std Dev      interval of the 
            difference 
         Lower      Upper 
Bad news     -6.245       178       .00             -.2957      .6336          -.3892      -.2023 
 
Finally, the results of a test to determine whether there was a difference in the average 
proportions of good to bad news contained in the narrative sections compared to the 
average proportions of good to bad news in the statutory accounts sections, are 
presented in Table 6.  The results show a mean of .9078 with a standard deviation of 
.6642. The t-statistic is 18.287 and is significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that 
the proportion of good to bad news contained in the narrative section of the annual 
reports is significantly greater than the proportion of good news to bad contained in 
the statutory accounts section.  
 
Table 6 One-sample statistics for neutrality of narrative discussion of good and 
bad news (test value = 0) 
                  95% Confidence 
Variable              t-statistic   df    Sig. (2-tailed)   Mean   Std Dev Interval of the 
         Difference 
         Lower      Upper 
Good/bad news     18.287    178          .00      .9078     .6642       .8099       1.0058 
 
Overall the results of the t-test suggest that managers are biased in favour of good 
news and against bad news. The results are consistent with the literature discussed 
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that suggests that company managers, in some cases, may be biased in presenting 
financial results especially when their reputation is at stake.  
 
 
6  Conclusions, implications and limitations   
 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate whether narrative discussion contained 
in the narrative section of annual reports of UK listed companies is neutral in respect 
of the financial results reported in the statutory accounts (profit and loss account and 
balance sheet). Neutrality of narrative discussion was determined by comparing the 
average proportion of good and bad news contained in statutory accounts with the 
average proportion of good and bad news contained in the narrative sections of the 
annual reports.  
 
A survey was undertaken to determine what constitutes good and bad news in the 
statutory accounts. The results of a comparison of average proportions of good news 
contained in the narrative and statutory accounts sections suggest that the narrative 
sections contained a significantly higher proportion of good news than the statutory 
accounts sections. The results of a comparison of proportions of bad news in the two 
sections of the annual report suggest that the narrative sections contain a significantly 
lower proportion of bad news compared to the statutory accounts sections. Finally, 
the results also indicate that the proportion of good to bad news in the narrative 
sections is significantly higher than that of good to bad news contained in the 
statutory accounts sections. The conclusion of this investigation is that managers are 
not neutral in their narrative discussion. They are biased in favour of good news and 
against bad news.  
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There are a number of policy implications for the current findings, if the results are 
confirmed by future research. For those who prepare annual reports, the findings of 
impartiality on their part may bring about undesirable consequences. These may include 
new legislation to compel management to be objective regarding both good and bad 
news. The purpose of the legislation would be to constrain their ability to choose which 
aspects of financial performance and position they discuss.  
 
The findings that narrative discussions are biased also suggest that users, particularly the 
unsophisticated, are being ‘fooled’ since there is evidence that they do not understand 
financial statements and rely on narrative parts of the annual report (Lee and Tweedie, 
1975 and Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). Whilst sophisticated users may not be ‘fooled’ 
by the biased narrative discussion, the bias means that they are denied the chance of a 
full explanation for poor performance.  
 
For the regulators, the findings in this paper suggest that they need to take action to 
protect the users of financial statements who need neutral information to be able to make 
investment decisions. One way may be to make the OFR compulsory. The other route 
may be to introduce more prescriptive legislation to compel directors to provide a 
narrative discussion of particular items in the financial statements regardless of whether 
the outcome is regarded as good or bad by management.  
 
The bias in narrative discussion may also have implications for auditors whose interest 
is to protect the stakeholders of the company. Bias in narrative discussion may increase 
the chances of auditors being sued. It may therefore be in the interest of the auditors to 
examine the narrative discussion to establish whether it is objective given the financial 
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results. If auditors do not take such an initiative it may well be that the role will be 
forced upon them in future. 
  
The conclusions and implications discussed above must be taken in the context of the 
limitations of the current study. Firstly, the determination of good and bad news is 
based on the views of 5 respondents although 30 were surveyed. However, the 
findings are consistent with finance literature and were also later confirmed in a larger 
survey that is the subject of a different paper.  
 
A further limitation is that in certain circumstances an increase or decrease in 
expenses may not necessarily imply good news. For example, an increase in cost of 
sales may simply be a reflection of the increase in sales. This limitation can be 
alleviated by examining the relative increase in sales compared to the cost of sales. 
Increase in cost of sales would therefore be regarded as bad news if the percentage 
increase is more than the percentage increase in sales.  
 
Further, the study is cross sectional rather than a trend analysis.  Finally, the content 
analysis of the narrative was accomplished manually. Use of computer content 
analysis packages may help improve objectivity of the coding. Despite these 
limitations we still believe that the findings reported are significant and are likely to 
be confirmed by future research. 
 22
Bibliography  
 
Accounting Standards Board  (1993), Operating and financial review; London; 
Accounting Standards Board. 
 
Accounting Standards Board  (1999), Statement of principles for financial  
reporting; London;  Accounting Standards Board. 
 
 Bartlett, S.A. and Chandler, R.A . (1997), ‘The corporate report and the private  
shareholder: Lee and Tweedie twenty years on’, British Accounting Review,  
Vol. 29, pp 245-261.  
 
Beattie, V. and Jones, M.J . (1992), ‘The use and abuse of graphs in annual reports: 
theoretical framework and empirical study’, Accounting and Business Research,  
Vol. 22, No.88, pp 291-303. 
 
Botosan, C.A. and Harris, M.S. (2000), ‘Motivations for a change in disclosure 
frequency and its consequences: An examination of voluntary quarterly segment  
disclosures’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp 329-353. 
 
Chow, C.W. and Wong-Boren, A. (1987), ‘Voluntary financial disclosure by 
Mexican corporations’, The Accounting Review, Vol. 62, No.3, pp 533-541.  
 
Clark, R.C. (1985), ‘Agency costs versus fiduciary duties’, In J. Pratt and R.  
Zeckhauser (eds.), Principals and agents: The structure of business, Boston, Mass.: 
Harvard Business School Press, pp 55-79. 
 
Companies Act 1985. Companies Act 1985, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. London. 
 
Duska, R.F. (1992), ‘Why be a loyal agent? A systematic ethical analysis’, in 
Ethics and agency theory: An introduction, Bowie, N.E., and Freeman, E., (eds.),  
Oxford University Press.  
 
Fama, E.F. and Jensen , M.C. (1983), ‘Separation of ownership and control’, Journal of 
Law and Economics, June, pp 301-325. 
 
Hagerman, R.L. and Zmijewski, M.E. (1979), ‘Some economic determinants of 
accounting policy choice’, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 1, pp 141-161. 
 
 
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), ‘Theory of a firm: Managerial 
behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 
3, No.1, pp 305-60. 
 
Lee, T.A. and Tweedie, D.P. (1975),  ‘Accounting information: An investigation of 
private shareholder usage’, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 5, No. 20, pp 280-
291.     
         
 
 
 23
London Stock Exchange. (1999). The listing rules, London Stock Exchange, London. 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. ((1999), Student’s manual of accounting: the guide to UK 
accounting law and practice, International Thomson Business Press. 
 
Metzger, M., Bowie, N. and DeGeorge, R.T. (eds.). (1986), Business Law and 
 Regulatory Environment, Homewood, III.: Richard D.Irwin. 
 
Smith, A. (1776), An enquiry into the causes of wealth of nations, Canan, E (ed), New 
York: Random House, 1937. 
 
Smith, C.W. and Warner, J. (1979),  ‘On financial contracting: An analysis of bond 
covenants. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp 117-161. 
 
Straw, B.M, McKechnie, P.I and Puffer, S.M. (1983), ‘The justification of  
 organisational performance’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4,  
 pp. 582-600. 
 
Wilton, R. L. and Tabb, J.B. (1978), ‘An investigation into private shareholder usage of 
financial statements in New Zealand’, Accounting Education, May, pp 171. 
 
Winfield, R.R. (1978), ‘Shareholder opinion of published financial statements’ 
A paper presented at the Accounting Association of Australia and New Zealand, 
University of Otago, New Zealand. 
 24
Appendix I 
 
Survey of finance directors' perception of good and bad news in annual 
reporting 
 
Instructions: You are given the following items of information that appear or could 
appear in your company's annual report. Can you please indicate by ticking the 
appropriate box, to what extent you believe an INCREASE in current year's figures 
over last year's figures represents GOOD or BAD news? In each case assume that the 
increase is material and the expectations by the users of your company's annual report 
was that the current year’s figures would be the same as the previous year's figures. 
 
Key: 
1. bad news                          3. neither bad news                 4. slightly good news 
2. slightly bad news                 nor good news                       5. good news 
 
Profit and loss account   
                                                                                                                 
1. Turnover             1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
  
2. Cost of sales            1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                   
 
3. Gross profit                                                                   1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
                
4. Net operating expenses          1    2   3     4   5
                                                                                                  
      
5. Operating profit          1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
      
6. Profit on sale of properties         1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
      
7.        Provision for loss on operations to be discontinued                 1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
  
8. Loss on disposal of discontinued operations                             1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
    
9. Profit on ordinary activities before interest                  1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
   
10. Interest payable                                                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
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11. Profit on ordinary activities before taxation                             1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
 
12. Tax on profit on ordinary activities                                         1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
     
13. Profit on ordinary activities after taxation                  1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
   
14. Minority interests                                                                 1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
 
15. Profit for the financial year                                          1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
     
16. Dividends                                                                                    1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
 
17. Retained profit for the financial year                                         1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
  
18. Earnings per share                                                                  1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
Balance sheet  
        
19. Fixed assets (total)                   1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
        
20. Tangible fixed assets (total)                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                 
    
21. Intangible fixed  (total)                    1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
 
22. Current Assets  (total)                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
       
23. Stocks                        1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                   
 
24. Debtors                       1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
       
25. Cash at bank and in hand                     1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
       
26. Prepayments                       1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
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27. Creditors: amounts falling due 
within one year                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
  
28. Provision for corporation tax                     1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
      
29. Accrued charges                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
  
30. Bank overdraft                                 1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
       
31. Net current assets                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
    
32. Creditors: amounts falling due after  
more than one year                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
  
33. Debentures                       1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                   
 
34. Share capital                           1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                  
      
35. Share premium                      1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                   
 
36. Profit and loss account                     1    2    3   4    5
                                                                                                   
 
Could you please supply your details in the space provided below if you are willing to 
participate in a follow-up interview so that I can contact you to arrange for a mutually 
convenient time? 
 
Name_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Address_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Telephone_______________ Fax ______________ Email_____________________ 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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Appendix II 
 
Statutory Accounts  section scoring sheet 
 
Company Name_____________________________________________________ 
 
List of Items 
Profit and loss account       Good/Bad News                               
1. Turnover        ________  
2. Cost of sales        ________ 
3. Gross profit        ________                                 
4. Net operating expenses      ________ 
5. Operating profit       ________ 
6. Profit on sale of properties      _______ 
7. Provision for loss on operations to be discontinued   _______ 
8. Loss on disposal of discontinued operations    _______                                  
9. Profit on ordinary activities before interest    _______ 
10. Interest payable       _______                                  
11. Profit on ordinary activities before taxation    _______                                  
12. Tax on profit on ordinary activities     _______                                  
13. Profit on ordinary activities after taxation    _______ 
14. Minority interests       _______                                  
15. Profit for the financial year      _______                                  
16. Dividends        _______  
17. Retained profit for the financial year     _______                                  
18. Earnings per share        _______                                  
Balance sheet   
19. Fixed assets (total)                ________ 
20. Tangible fixed assets (total)        ________ 
21. Intangible fixed  (total)      ________                                
22. Current assets (total)       ________ 
23. Stocks         ________                                
24.       Debtors        ________ 
25. Cash at bank and in hand      ________ 
26. Prepayments        ________ 
27. Creditors: amounts falling due within one year   ________ 
28. Provision for corporation tax      ________                
29. Accrued charges       ________ 
30. Bank overdraft       ________                         
31. Net current assets       ________                                
32. Creditors: amounts falling due after more than one year  ________                
33. Debentures        ________                                
34. Share capital        _______                   
35. Share premium       _______                                  
36.      Profit and loss account                  _______                                  
Total                                _______ 
Good News         _______ 
Proportion of Good News       _______ 
Bad News         _______ 
Proportion of Bad News                             _______ 
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Appendix III 
 
Narrative section scoring sheet 
 
Company Name_____________________________________________________ 
 
List of Items 
Profit and loss account       Good/Bad News                               
1. Turnover        ________  
2. Cost of sales        ________ 
3. Gross profit        ________                                 
4. Net operating expenses      ________ 
5. Operating profit       ________ 
6. Profit on sale of properties      _______ 
7.         Provision for loss on operations to be discontinued   _______ 
8. Loss on disposal of discontinued operations    _______                                  
9. Profit on ordinary activities before interest    _______ 
10. Interest payable       _______                                  
11. Profit on ordinary activities before taxation    _______                                  
12. Tax on profit on ordinary activities     _______                                  
13. Profit on ordinary activities after taxation    _______ 
14. Minority interests       _______                                  
15. Profit for the financial year      _______                                  
16. Dividends        _______  
17. Retained profit for the financial year     _______                                  
18. Earnings per share        _______                                  
Balance sheet       
19. Fixed assets (total)                ________ 
20. Tangible fixed assets (total)        ________ 
21. Intangible fixed  (total)      ________                                
22. Current Assets  (total)       ________ 
23. Stocks         ________                                
24.       Debtors        ________ 
25. Cash at bank and in hand      ________ 
26. Prepayments        ________ 
27. Creditors: amounts falling due within one year   ________ 
28. Provision for corporation tax      ________                
29. Accrued charges       ________ 
30. Bank overdraft       ________                         
31. Net current assets       ________                                
32. Creditors: amounts falling due after more than one year  ________                
33. Debentures        ________                                
34. Share capital        _______                   
35. Share premium       _______                                  
36.       Profit and loss account      _______                                   
Total                                _______ 
Good News         _______ 
Proportion of Good News       _______ 
Bad News         _______ 
Proportion of Bad News                                               _________ 
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